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Introduction
An authenticated encryption scheme (AES) can be used for message recovery. In the AES scheme, authentication involves generation of a signature by the sender using a private key on sending a message. Secure encryption techniques can be used to encrypt the message so that a designated recipient recovers the signed message and verifies the corresponding signature [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7] . A strong AES should maintain the secrecy of the message and the authenticity of the sender and recipient, and the sender should not refute his/her signature after signature generation.
In 2013, Thadvai et al. [8] proposed a novel authenticated encryption scheme with convertibility. They claimed that the proposed scheme satisfies all the properties of an ideal authenticated encryption scheme (AES). However, this paper shows that Thadvai et al.'s scheme still suffers from a forgery converted signature attack [9] , that is, any one can forge a valid converted signature of a signer on an arbitrary message. Certainly, the secure requirement against the forgery converted signature attack should also be concerned about. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the Thadvai et al.'s AES scheme. Section 3 showed how the adversary forges a converted signature in Thadvai et al.'s AES scheme. Finally, conclusions are given in Section 4.
Review of Thadvai et al.'s AES Scheme
This section briefly reviews Thadvai et al.'s AES scheme [8] . The Thadvai et al.'s AES scheme consists of three phases: initialization, signing and encryption, and public verification. The flow chart of the Thadvai et al.'s AES scheme is illustrated in Figure 1 and performs as follows. 
System initialization phase
Assume that A is the sender and B is the recipient. Let p be a large prime number such that p − 1 has a large prime factor with order q in the Galois field GF (p). Each participant has his/her own secret key X i in GF (p) and a corresponding public key Y i = g X i mod p, where g is the generator of GF (p). H(·) denotes a one-way hash function.
Signing and encryption phase
To sign the message m, Alice performs the following steps.
Select a random number
4. Compute r = MC2 C1 .
Compute s
= k − X A r mod q.
Compute q1 = H(M)C2 mod q.
7. Send (q1, r, s) to Bob.
After receiving (q1, r, s), Bob performs the following steps to derives the message m.
Public verification phase
For public verification, Bob sends (H(M), r, s, q1) to Trusted third party. Then the Trusted third party performs the following steps.
2. Verify the signature with the following equality:
If the equation does, the signature is valid.
Forgery Converted Signature Attack
This section shows that Thadvai et al.'s AES scheme is not secure by presenting the forgery converted signature attack [9] . Thadvai et al.'s scheme employs the one-way hash function to protect the message revealed in the public verification phase. However, their scheme is insecure by mounting the forgery converted signature attack as follows. The adversary tries to forge Alice's converted signature (H(M ), r , s , q1 ) in the public verification phase. The adversary performs the following steps.
1. Select an arbitrary message M and two random numbers s , r ∈ Z * q .
Compute
C2 = g s Y r A mod p. 3. Compute q1 = H(M )C2 mod q.
Send (H(M ), r , s , q1
) to Trusted third party.
After receiving (H(M ), r , s , q1 ), the Trusted third party performs the following steps.
The above equation (2) checked by the Trusted third party will be hold as follows.
Hence, any adversary can mount a forgery converted signature attack by using victim's public key to break the security of Thadvai et al.'s AES scheme.
Conclusions
This paper pointed out that recently proposed Thadvai et al.'s novel authenticated encryption scheme with convertibility still suffers from a forgery converted signature attack, that is, any one can forge a valid converted signature of a signer on an arbitrary message. Further works will be focused on improving the Thadvai et al.'s scheme which can be able to provide strong security.
